Studies have shown that complex institutional structures often impede democratic accountability by obscuring 'clarity of responsibility'. As an emerging federal system, the European Union (EU) divides decision-making powers between multiple levels of government. Yet little is known about whether European citizens attribute responsibility accordingly. In other words, do they hold the European Union, rather than national governments, to responsible for policy outcomes that are primarily decided at the EU level? This article investigates the extent to which contextual and individual-level factors influence citizens' attribution of responsibility in the European Union. We rely on unique survey data collected in all 27 EU member states to explore how citizens attribute responsibility across five policy areas. Employing a multilevel model of responsibility judgments, our findings show that citizens' evaluations do correspond to the institutional context, but that group-serving biases also influence attribution of responsibility in the EU.
Introduction
In the classic tradition of democratic theory, elections are inherently a sanctioning device in which voters reward or punish incumbents on the basis of past performance and thereby make elected officials responsive to public preferences (Fiorina 1981; Key 1966; Manin 1997; Powell 2000) . This model of elections as a sanctioning mechanism crucially relies on the assumption that voters are able to assign responsibility for policy outcomes. Responsibility judgments are thus the principle mechanism by which citizens hold representatives to account for their actions, as they intervene between evaluations of policy outcomes and voting behavior (Rudolph 2006 ). Yet, the task of assigning responsibility is more complicated in systems with multiple levels of government, such as federations, since citizens need to be aware of which responsibilities pertain to different levels of government in order to sanction politicians for their performance (Arceneaux 2006; Cutler 2004 Cutler , 2008 . This task becomes even more daunting if the institutions of multi-level government are continuously evolving and changing, as is the case in the European Union (EU). Nonetheless little is known about how voters attribute responsibility to different levels of government in multi-level systems, and no previous study has examined the basis of responsibility judgments in the EU specifically. This paper presents the first comprehensive study of how voters assign political responsibility in the European Union.
Numerous comparative studies of voting behavior have shown that complex institutional structures that blur lines of responsibility make it difficult for voters to hold governments to account (Anderson 2000; Hellwig 2001; Hellwig and Samuels 2008; Nadeau et al. 2002; Powell 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999) . Empirically, these studies have demonstrated that clarity of responsibility conditions the extent to which voters sanction governments on the basis of economic outcomes. But while responsibility judgments are at the heart of the argument about clarity of responsibility, very few studies have actually examined voters' attribution of responsibility directly. Only recent work has explicitly analyzed attribution judgments the federal systems of Canada and the US (Arcenaux 2006; Cutler 2004 Cutler , 2008 Rudolph 2003 Rudolph , 2003a . These studies find that both the institutional context and individual-level predispositions, notably partisanship, shape citizens' responsibility judgments in federations.
This study extends this literature by examining attribution of responsibility in a comparative context. The European Union provides the ideal laboratory for examining the impact of institutions responsibility judgments, because it allows us to examine citizens across 27 countries with considerable variation in both national political institutions and in levels of federal (EU) power. Moreover, by using individual-level data we can also investigate how individual-level predispositions, notably attachments to the national government and the EU, shape people's assignment of responsibility. To examine attribution of responsibility in the EU, we analyze a module of survey questions designed specifically to uncover citizens' opinions on responsibility, conducted in all 27 EU member states as a part of the 2009 European Election Studies (EES). Using multilevel analysis enables us to integrate both individual-level and context-level predictors in a single analysis. The paper thus contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, it presents the first large-scale comparative study of responsibility judgments and enhances our understanding of the effect of institutions on how voters assign responsibility. Second, unlike most studies of attribution and performance voting which have focused solely on economic policy-making, this study examines responsibility judgments across five policy domains: the economy, monetary policy, health care, immigration, and climate change. Third, it examines a hitherto largely overlooked aspect of European integration and contributes to our understanding of an evolving electoral democracy in the EU. Finally, the paper demonstrates that partisanship is not the only type of 'group-serving attribution bias' that can shape responsibility judgments in democracies, since varying levels of attachment to the EU are shown to have a powerful effect on how voters assign responsibility.
The paper proceeds as follows. First we briefly review the extant literature on how institutions and prior political beliefs affect attribution and democratic accountability. Second, we develop a model of how voters' assign responsibility in the EU, focusing on both institutional influences and individuallevel predispositions. Third, the data and methods used to test the hypotheses are discussed and we present the results. The findings show that citizens' responsibility judgments are shaped by the institutional context, yet group-serving attribution biases, notably attachment to the EU, also influence how voters assign responsibility. The final section discusses the implications of these finding for electoral democracy in multi-level systems.
Attribution and Accountability in Multi-Level Systems
In the classic reward-punishment model of electoral accountability, voters re-elect incumbents who have performed well, but oust those who have performed badly (Key 1966; Kramer 1971 ). Yet, this claim of a clear link between policy performance and vote choices has been called into question by scholars focusing on how voters assign political responsibility. First from an institutional perspective, studies have shown that institutional clarity of responsibility conditions voters' ability to make judgments about who is responsible for policy outcomes, and to sanction incumbents accordingly. Second from an individual-level perspective, scholars have argued that that responsibility judgments are influenced by 'group-serving attribution biases' and consequently prior political beliefs, such as partisanship, shape the link between policy evaluations, assignment of responsibility and vote choices.
Both of these extensions to the simple sanctioning model of electoral democracy are relevant if we want to understand how voters assign responsibility in multi-level systems of government. Starting with the institutional perspective, an extensive body of work suggests that the degree to which incumbents are held to account for economic performance (objective or subjective), that is the degree of 'economic voting', is conditioned by a system's institutional context. In particular, numerous studies have shown that clarity of responsibility is a key mediator between performance and vote choices. In their seminal article, Powell and Whitten (1993) demonstrate that elections in countries where responsibility is most easily focused on a single party are more likely to follow the reward-punishment model. Other comparative analyses of economic voting have supported the more general claim that economic voting is less prevalent when governments are weak and divided (e.g. minority and coalition governments) and legislatures are strong (e.g. strong committees and bicameral opposition) (Anderson 2000 (Anderson , 2006 Hellwig and Samuels 2008; Nadeau et al. 2002; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Duch and Stevenson 2008) . Most of these studies have focused on 'horizontal' institutional structures, such as coalition and divided government, but more recently some scholars have turned their attention to 'vertical' institutional structures, such as federal arrangements, arguing the multiple levels of government may also impede the quality of democratic accountability, since voters find it difficult to assign responsibilities for the policy outcomes that pertain to different levels of government and link these responsibility judgments to vote choice (Anderson 2000; Arceneaux 2006; Cutler 2004 Cutler , 2008 .
This 'clarity of responsibility' extension to the simple reward-punishment model focuses on context-level differences, but a number of recent studies have shifted the focus from a heterogeneous sanctioning process at the country-level to the individual level and have criticized the portrayal of vote choice as a simple function of policy performance in the early election literature (see e.g. Rudolph 2003: 699) . Instead it has been argued that voters' responsibility judgments are conditioned by their prior political beliefs, primarily their partisanship. 1 This notion of 'attribution bias' builds on the social psychology notion of 'group-serving attribution bias', which refers to the tendency of in-group members to attribute positive actions committed by their own group to positive in-group qualities and negative actions by the favored group to external causes (Hewstone 1989; Pettigrew 1979) . This in-group bias has been found in a number of contexts (Hewston 1989; Fiske and Taylor 2007) . In the political science literature, studies have looked at how partisanship influences political attitudes, including responsibility judgments (Campbell et al. 1960; Abramowitz 1988; Feldman 1982; Lewis-Beck 1997; Peffley 1984; Peffley and Williams 1985; Sigelman and Knight 1985; Stein 1990) , and more recent work has examined directly how partisanship shapes attribution of responsibility. Notably a series of studies by Rudolph have shown not only that attribution is an important mediator of economic evaluations in predicting vote choices, but that partisanship is a significant predictor of who is thought responsible for the economy in the first place (Rudolph 2003 (Rudolph , 2003a (Rudolph , 2006 . The importance of partisanship in shaping citizens' responsibility judgments has also been demonstrated in recent work on the economy and public services in Britain and Ireland (Marsh and Tilley 2010) and on assignment of responsibility for the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2008 (Gomez and Wilson 2008; Maestas et al. 2008; Malhotra and Kuo 2008 ). Yet, only few studies explicitly consider how partisanship might operate as a heuristic in a federal system (see Rudolph 2003 as an exception), and no extant work considers whether other in-group/outgroup divisions may be salient when it comes to shaping attribution judgments in multi-level systems. In the next section, we extend this literature to develop a set of theoretical expectations about how individual-level and contextual-level factors shape attribution of responsibility in the European Union.
Attribution of responsibility in the European Union
There is a long-running debate on how to characterize the European Union: as a federation, an embryonic federal state, a 'demoicracy', a system of multi-level governance or something else? (Kohler-Koch 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2003; Nicolaïdes 2006) . Regardless of the precise definition, there is a 1 Other scholars have focused on how partisanship shapes economic evaluations directly. It has been argued that the causal arrow runs in the opposite direction to that posited in the classic economic voting model (Evans and Andersen, 2006; Wilcox and Wlezien 1996; Wlezien et al. 1997) , whereas others have disputed this (Conover et al. 1986; Lewis-Beck 2006; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008 ). This paper does not enter this debate, but focuses instead on how partisanship -and other group-serving biases -affect attribution of responsibility. broad agreement among scholars that the scope and depth of policy-making at the EU has dramatically increased over the past decades and that it today has many traits in common with a federal state.
European voters consequently face considerable challenges when deciding whether policy outcomes are the responsibility of the national (or local) government or the EU level, just like they do in more established federal states such as the US and Canada. But despite the emerging federal nature of the EU, there has been little research investigating whether citizens realize the degree to which policy decisions that affect their day-to-day lives are now taken in Brussels rather than at the national level (see Sinnott 1995) . More importantly, we have a limited understanding of how citizens arrive at responsibility judgements in the context of divided authority in the EU.
To be able to effectively sanction governments in federal systems, citizens must be able to make distinctions between the responsibilities that pertain to different levels of government. But attributing responsibility correctly in multi-level systems is a daunting task (Anderson 2006; Cutler 2004 Cutler , 2008 . Not only may voters have difficulty figuring out who is responsible for what, but politicians may also have any incentive to engage in blame shifting and credit taking that will further serve to undermine clear responsibility linkages. Anderson's (2006) comparative study of economic voting has shown that the existence of multi-level structures of governance slightly reduces the degree of economic voting. In the Canadian context, Cutler (2004 Cutler ( , 2008 has shown that voters do not strongly differentiate the governments' roles across issues, and that they are more likely to ignore issues in their vote calculations when the assignment of responsibility is unclear. These findings suggest that federalism may reduce voters' ability to hold governments to account. Yet, a number of other studies, especially in the US context, have reached more optimistic conclusions about voters' ability to distinguish between the responsibility of different levels of government and hold candidates responsible for the policies assigned to their respective offices Partin 1995, 1998; Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel 1995; Arceneaux 2006 ). Arceneaux (2006) finds that citizens are capable of making distinctions in terms of what different levels of government do and that these distinctions structure where voters attribute credit or blame for policy outcomes. However, these responsibility assessments only affect voting behavior at different levels within the federal system when the issues upon which voters are attributing responsibility are highly accessible and salient to voters.
Impact of the institutional context
This raises the question of whether European citizens incorporate information about divisions of power between the national and the European level into their attribution of responsibility, or whether such judgments are insensitive to the institutional context? Responsibility for most policy outcomes is, of course, shared among national and EU institutions (and other governmental and non-governmental actors), and policy outcomes may therefore legitimately by attributed to either level. However, as the remainder of this paper will elaborate, there are certain features of the institutional context that make attribution of responsibility to the EU more or less likely, particularly as the functional responsibilities of the EU vary both across policy domains and across EU member states. These features allow us to examine the extent to which the institutional context matters to citizens' responsibility judgements.
We would expect that citizens attribute greater responsibility to the EU on issues pertaining to policy areas where the EU level of government has greater decision-making power. Establishing clear divisions of functional responsibility is difficult, since most competencies are overlapping. Yet, the EU's Lisbon Treaty, ratified in December 2009, made an attempt to clarify divisions of power in the EU by outlining three categories of competences: first, exclusive competences, where the EU can make directives and conclude international agreements, second, shared competences, where member states cannot exercise competence in areas where the Union has already done so, and finally complementary competences, where the Union's powers are limited to actions to support, coordinate or supplement member states' actions. 2 To the extent that voters' perceptions of power correspond to these divisions, we would expect that they attribute greater responsibility in areas of exclusive competences 3 (e.g. monetary policy-making and competition and trade policy) than in areas of complementary competences (e.g. health policy and foreign and security policy). This leads to our first hypothesis: H1: Citizens attribute greater responsibility to the EU on issues pertaining to exclusive or shared EU competences than issues pertaining to complementary competences.
Moreover, as we are interested in how citizens assign responsibility across multiple levels of government in the EU, we would expect that not only the nature of institutions at the EU (federal) level influences citizens responsibility judgments, but equally that the character of national political institutions influences how citizens assign responsibility. In particular, we expect that the effectiveness 2 
See Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, Title 1, Articles 2-6 (Official Journal C 115 of 9 May 2008) 3 The EU has exclusive competences in the following areas (a) customs union; (b) competition rules; (c) monetary policy for Eurozone members; (d) common fisheries policy; (e) common commercial policy. and quality of national political institutions will influence the extent to which citizens' perceive the national level of government as responsible for a given policy area, and that in turn will influence relative attribution of responsibility to the EU. 4 In a US context, it has been demonstrated that citizen perceptions of gubernatorial responsibility is reduced when state institutions are less effective, due to divided government (Rudolph 2003) . Equally we would expect that in a European context, citizens living in countries with national political institutions suffering from problems such as corruption and poor performance of the state, will be less likely to assign responsibility to national institutions and more likely to turn to the supranational institutions at the European level, as they are perceived to be relatively more effective. This leads to our second hypothesis: H2: Citizens in countries with high quality of national political institutions attribute relatively less responsibility to the EU than citizens in countries with lower quality national political institutions.
The institutional context also varies across policy domains, and this should influence responsibility judgments. The involvement of governmental actors may vary across policy domains both at the EU level and at the national level. Starting at the EU level, in some policy domains not all member states have transferred equal powers to the EU. The most obvious example is the EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which established a currency union (known as the 'Eurozone') in 1999. Yet, in 2010 only 16 of the EU's 27 members have adopted the euro, and 11 countries thus remain outside the Eurozone 5 .
Since the European Central Bank (ECB) determines monetary policy and the EU's Council sets fiscal guidelines and monitors national budgets of members of the Eurozone, we would expect that citizens' in Eurozone countries would attribute greater responsibility to the EU in the area of economic policymaking, and particularly monetary policy. There are other examples of EU as a 'multi-speed Union', such as the borderless zone (Schengen), which the UK and Ireland remain outside, and 'opt-outs' granted to specific countries in policy domains, notably the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Justice and Home 4 Some studies have shown that the quality of national institutions influences citizens' support for the European Union, arguing that poorly functioning national institutions lowers the opportunity cost of transferring sovereignty to Europe (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000; Rohrschneider 2002 ). 5 Two countries, Denmark and the UK, have opt-outs from joining the Eurozone, whereas Sweden has a de facto opt-out. Eight other member states are obliged to join the zone once they fulfill the entry (convergence) criteria.
Affairs. 6 Generally, we would citizens in countries subject to such opt-outs would attribute less responsibility to the EU in the relevant policy domain: H3: Citizens in countries with an opt-out from an EU policy domain attribute relatively less responsibility to the EU in that domain than citizens in countries without an opt-out.
Whereas the EU's decision-making competences are identical across member states in most policy domains, we can find differences in the level of national government activity in most policy areas. For example, in the domain of health care policy, some countries have large government-funded health care systems, whereas others have largely private insurance-based systems. All other things being equal, we would expect that citizens in countries with large government-funded health care sectors would attribute more responsibility to national governments and relatively less responsibility to the EU, for policy outcomes in health care policy. Similarly across other policy areas, we would expect that higher levels of national government activity would lead to greater attribution of responsibility to national governments vis-a-vis EU level.
H4: Citizens in countries with higher level of government activity in a policy domain attribute relatively less responsibility to the EU for policy outcomes in that domain compared to citizens in countries with lower levels of national government activity.
This section has discussed the impact of context-level factors on responsibility judgments, but we know that individual-level predispositions also shape the attribution process. Individuals rely on heuristics when forming opinions about political responsibility (Lupia and McCubbins 1998) , but the use of heuristics will not influence all individuals in a similar manner. Next we turn to the issue of how groupserving attribution biases may influence attribution of responsibility to the EU.
Impact of group-serving biases
Few studies have explicitly examined how voters use of heuristics and 'perceptual biases' may influence the way in which voters assign responsibility in a federal context. An exception is the study by Rudolph (2003) , which shows that American voters engage in partisan rationalizations when they attribute responsibility for fiscal conditions in states, i.e. partisans are more likely to attribute responsibility for improving economic conditions when they favor the Governor's party.
We expect similar group-serving attribution biases to influence how voters assign responsibility in the European Union. The main difference in the context of multi-level system, such as the EU, is that when responsibility is assigned to more than one level, partisanship might not be the only 'in-group' of importance. At the national level, we would expect partisanship to be an important factor conditioning whether or not voters decide to hold the government responsible for policy performance. But when it comes to the EU level, partisanship is not expected to be a decisive factor, since the EU has a mixed, collective executive consisting of delegates of different political persuasions from all member states. It is therefore very difficult to identify a specific 'partisan' affiliation of the Council, or even the Commission (Follesdal and Hix 2006) . Instead research has shown that that primary factor determining attitudes towards policies at the European level are general attitudes towards the EU, which in turn are driven by identity concerns (McLaren 2006; Marks 2005, 2009 ). In other words, the 'nation' versus 'Europe' may be regarded as a salient in-group/out-group division in this context. Studies have shown that people who have more exclusive national identities are more likely to be more Euroskeptic (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004; McLaren 2006) . 7 Indeed, such opinions about the EU have become increasingly politicized in recent decades (Hooghe and Marks 2009 ). If the relative attachment to the European Union serves as a salient in-group, we would expect that feelings about the EU will affect responsibility judgments in a similar manner to partisanship. Hence, people with low levels of attachment to the EU, so-called Euroskeptics, will be more likely to attribute responsibility to the EU when things are going badly, just like opposition partisans are more likely to blame the government for a crisis. In contrast, people who feel attached to the EU are more likely to attribute responsibility to the EU when conditions are improving.
H5: Citizens who support the EU are more likely to attribute responsibility to the EU when conditions are improving and less likely when conditions are deteriorating.
Of course, partisanship might still matter when it comes to attribution of responsibility to national institutions. That is, people who identify with the party in national government will be more likely to attribute responsibility to the national level of government for improving conditions, while absolving the 7 Other factors, specifically utilitarian cost-benefit calculations, have also been shown to influence citizens' support for the European Union (see Gabel 1998; McLaren 2006) . national government of blame when conditions are worsening by holding the EU responsible instead.
This leads to our final hypothesis:
H6: Citizens who identify with a party in national government are less likely to attribute responsibility to the EU when conditions are improving and more likely when conditions are deteriorating.
The next section presents the data and methods used to test these propositions.
Data and Methods
To examine responsibility judgments in the European Union, we have designed a module of questions The dependent variable in our analysis is the degree to which respondents attribute responsibility to the EU for a particular policy-domain. There are two important issues to note about our operationalization of the dependent variable. First, we deliberately focus on 'functional responsibility' (or what some social psychologists refer to as 'role responsibility'), which refers to the obligations that institutions or individuals are expected to fulfil. Governments, for example, are expected to serve a particular set of functions and failure to do so should result in electoral sanction (Arcenaux 2006). Second, since our objective is to examine attribution of responsibility to different levels of government in a multi-level system, we measure attribution of responsibility to the EU level of government relative to the attribution of responsibility to the national level government. We refer to this as Net EU attribution. The question wording can be illustrated with these questions asked to British respondents about the economy:
Now I would like to ask you some questions about how much responsibility the British government and the European Union have for some of the things going on in Britain. Of course, you may think that neither is responsible. First, thinking about the economy, how responsible is the British government for economic conditions in Britain? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "no responsibility" and 10 means "full responsibility". And what about the European Union, how responsible is the EU for economic conditions in Britain?
The same type of questions was asked for four other policy areas: interest rates, health care, immigration and climate change. Since each dependent variable has been operationalized as 'EU attribution score' minus 'national government attribution score', the net EU attribution score 9 runs from -10 to +10 for each policy area, where +10 indicates that only the EU is responsible and -10 that only the national government is responsible. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable across policy domains. Recall that our expectation is that is that citizens attribute more responsibility in policy areas where the EU has exclusive competences than in areas where they have only complementary/coordination competences (H1). Indeed, we do find that net EU attribution is the lowest in the area of health care, which is a complementary competence. Perhaps more surprisingly, we find the highest net EU attribution in the area of climate change, which is not an exclusive EU competence, but it may be regarded as inherently a "cross-border" issue by voters. Also, this is an area where the EU has become increasingly active in recent years, albeit in a coordinating role. The second highest level of net EU attribution is, less surprisingly, interest rates. The EU has exclusive competence for monetary policy-making within the Eurozone, and as expected we therefore find significantly higher levels of net EU attribution in Eurozone countries (0.34, s.d. 3.72) compared with non-Eurozone countries (-1.53, s.d. 3.51) .
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 9 There are, of course, many other ways in which the dependent variable could be operationalized. For example, the attribution scales could be computed to construct a nominal variable of those respondents who think the EU is most responsible, those who think the national government is most responsible, those who think they are jointly responsible and those who think nobody is responsible. The results produced when estimating the models below with such a dependent variable are almost identical. However, we would argue that our operationalization is preferable as more information is retained.
These descriptive statistics thus lend some support to our first hypotheses that the institutional context has an impact on EU attribution. The next step is to specify a statistical model which can be estimated to explain variation in net EU attribution both within countries and across countries. The most suitable approach is to use multilevel analysis. For both statistical and substantive reasons, we cannot simply pool the EES national surveys and ignore that individual attitudes are also nested within a national context. Neglecting the hierarchical structure of the data would lead to an underestimation of standard errors and the likelihood of spurious inferences (Steenbergen and Jones 2002) . To overcome the statistical challenges and exploit the theoretical opportunities presented by our multilevel data, we employ a hierarchical model in our analysis. A fixed effects model is less suitable in this case since it would not enable us to explore the effect of context-level factors. Hierarchical (or random-effects) models allow us to explicitly model differences in responsibility judgments according to the national institutional context. Such models correct for dependence of observations within countries (intra-class correlation) and make adjustments to both within and between parameter estimates for the clustered nature of the data (Snijders and Bosker 1999) .
Starting at the individual-level, we hypothesized that net EU attribution will be influenced by two types of group-serving attribution biases, support for the European Union and attachment to the party in national government. EU support is operationalized as an additive scale, based on four questions tapping into respondents' feelings about the EU and the European integration project. These items are highly correlated (Cronbach's alpha of 0.65) and form a single dimension. Government partisan is a dummy for respondents who say they feel closer to one of the national government parties. To test hypotheses 5 and 6 concerning group-serving attribution bias, it is necessary to evaluate whether these in-groups mediate the effect of performance on attribution. Performance evaluation was measured separately for each of the five policy areas as a retrospective evaluation of performance. To assess the mediating effect of in-group we include two interaction terms in our models: one between EU support and policy evaluation and one between partisanship and policy evaluation. We also control for political knowledge at the individual level, since more politically knowledgeable people might be expected to be better able to distinguish between the responsibilities of different levels of government. 10 Political awareness was measured as an additive scale using a set of 7 factual knowledge questions relating to 10 Other individual-level controls, such as age, class, income, gender and left-right ideology, were included in previous models, but the made no difference to the results presented here, so we decided to present a more parsimonious model. national governments and the EU (see Zaller 1992: appendix where the outcome is net EU attribution, i indexes individuals, j indexes each country. β 0j is the intercept in the model and r ij denotes the individual-level residuals.
As discussed above, we are not only interested in the individual-level correlates of EU attribution, but also in how the institutional context shapes responsibility judgments. To test Hypothesis 2, we measure the Quality of national institutions by using the World Bank's Governance Indicators on Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption (see Kaufmann et al. 2009 ). We created an additive scale of these five indicators (Cronbach's alpha 0.96), which runs from 0 to 10. Our other context variables differ across issues, capturing either the degree of EU involvement in national politics (H3) or the degree of national government involvement in a specific policy domain (H4). To capture the degree of EU involvement in the economy, and particularly monetary policy, we include a dummy for the 16 Eurozone members. The degree of EU involvement in the area of immigration is captured by a dummy for those countries who do not participate in the Schengen border-free zone (UK and Ireland) or who have another opt-out relating to common immigration policy (Denmark).
The EU's influence in the areas of health care and climate change does not vary across countries, however, we capture variation in the policy-specific institutional context by measuring the varying levels of activity by national governments. To measure the level of government involvement in health care, we include a measure of National government spending on health care (as a percentage of all spending). To measure the level of government involvement in efforts to deal with climate change, we include a dummy for countries that have adopted National Adaptation Strategies (NAS) on climate change, which is a detailed strategy for how to deal with climate change at the national level. Finally, we control for the size of the economy (GDP), since it may be argued that larger economies and richer countries have more powerful national institutions relative to the EU. 12 Hence, at the country level, we model the individual-level constant as a function of country-level predictors. By specifying a level 2 random effect (u 0j ), we avoid imposing the difficult assumption that our model accounts for all possible sources of contextual heterogeneity (Snijders and Bosker 1999) . The level-2 model has been specified as: The results are discussed in the next section.
Results
Across each of the five policy areas, we run two hierarchical linear models to test our propositions:
Model 1 contains only individual-level predictors and tests the two "group-serving attribution bias" hypotheses with interactions between performance perceptions and EU attitudes (H5) and government partisanship (H6). We expect the first interaction term to be positive, as EU supporters attribute more responsibility to the EU when conditions are improving, and the second to be negative, as national government partisans give the EU less credit for improving conditions. In Model 2 we also include contextual variables to test the effects of the national and EU institutional context (H2, H3 and H4). We expect that the more effective national political institutions are, the lower the level of net EU attribution. Equally, we should see lower levels of EU attribution in countries that have opted out of certain aspects of the Union's policy-making framework. The results are shown in Tables 2 to 6.
[ We start by looking at Model 1 across the five policy domains to see if there is evidence of group-serving attribution biases at the individual-level. The significant interactions between EU support and evaluation across all policy areas except climate change (Table 6 ) suggest support for Hypothesis 5,  namely that people who support the EU are more likely to attribute responsibility to the EU when 12 Previous models also included a range of other context-level controls that could have an impact on attribution:
GDP per capita, age of democracy, EU accession year, a dummy for new member states, Freedom House score etc.. But none of these variables were statistically significant or changed the findings shown here. We have therefore chosen to not include these context variables in the final models due to the degrees of freedom problem that easily occurs with only 27 countries.
conditions are improving and less likely when conditions are worsening. However, we cannot interpret this conditional relationship by simply looking at the sign and significance of the interaction term (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2008) . To demonstrate how belonging to the EU 'in-group' conditions the effect of performance evaluations on EU attribution, we graphically illustrate how the marginal effect of performance evaluation on net EU attribution changes across different levels of EU support in Figure 1 (based on estimates from Model 1).
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] Figure 1a (health care) and Figure 1b (immigration) show the strongest support for our groupserving hypothesis. These graphs clearly show that the effect of performance evaluation on net EU attribution is modified by levels of EU support: the marginal effect is positive for EU supporters and negative for Euroskeptics, as we would expect. For immigration, the effect of performance evaluations on net EU attribution is only statistical significant for the people with very low or very high levels of EU support. We also find a conditioning impact of EU support on the effect of performance evaluation on attribution in the two economic policy domains, the economy (Figure 1c ) and interest rates (Figure 1d ).
But surprisingly, both Euroskeptics and Europhiles attribute greater responsibility to the EU when they perceive economic conditions to be improving. The marginal effect of performance evaluation is much greater, however, for people with higher levels of EU support, as we would expect. Overall, we find strong support for Hypothesis 5.
We find less support for our second group-serving attribution hypothesis (H6) relating to government partisanship. Our expectation was that government partisans would attribute relatively more responsibility to the EU as they perceive conditions to worsen, as they absolve their own governments of responsibility and shift the blame to the EU level. Yet, we only find evidence of such a relationship in the policy domains of monetary policy (Table 3 ) and immigration (Table 4 ). This suggests that 'EU' versus 'the nation' may act as a stronger in-group/out-group distinction in the context of attribution to the EU than partisanship. It is also worth noting that political awareness has a significant impact on EU attribution in all of our models, yet the direction of the effect differs depending on the policy domain: politically aware citizens are more likely to attribute responsibility to the EU for interest rates and climate change, and less likely to attribute responsibility to the EU for the economy, health care and immigration.
Next, we turn to Model 2 to examine the impact of the national and EU institutional context on net EU attribution. Starting with the national institutional context, we find some support for the expectation that the quality of national institutions influences the level of net EU attribution (H2). The coefficient is negative and significant for 3 out of 5 policy areas, controlling for size of the economy and policy-specific institutions. 13 In these policy areas, higher quality national institutions thus lead to lower levels of EU attribution We find the strongest effect for the economy (-0.14, s.e. 0.04) and health care (-0.13, s.e. 0.07), followed by immigration (-0.12, s.e. 0.06) . This suggests that the effectiveness of national institutions has a greater effect in policy domains where individuals attribute greater responsibility to the national governments in the first place.
We also find support for the hypothesis that policy-specific institutions influence net EU attribution. Unsurprisingly, we find the greatest effect for Eurozone membership, as citizens in countries who belong to the Eurozone attribute significantly more responsibility to the EU than citizens in non-Eurozone countries (H3). It is worth noting, that this effect is considerably greater for the policy domain of interest rates (coefficient 1.74, s.e. 0.37, see Table 3 ) than the economy (coefficient 0.96, s.e. 0.21, Table 2 ). This is encouraging since Eurozone membership should have a greater effect on monetary policy-making than fiscal policy-making. In contrast to Eurozone membership, we find no significant effect of immigration related opt-outs on attribution in the field of immigration (Table 4 ). Turning to policy-specific institutions at the national level, we also find support for our hypothesis that higher levels of national government activity in a policy-domain leads to lower net EU attribution. A larger government-funded health care sector leads to lower net EU attribution ( Table 5 ). We also find a considerably effect of National Adaptation Strategies in the area of climate change: citizens in countries with such strategies attribute less responsibility to the EU (see Table 6 ).
Overall, we thus find that the institutional context both at the national and at the EU level plays a considerable role in shaping responsibility judgments, whereas the size of the economy appears to make little difference. If we compare the model fit of our two models, the deviance statistics suggest that Model 2, which includes the institutional variables, is the preferred model across all issue areas, except immigration (Table 4) where the institutional context adds little explanatory value. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), which includes a penalty for additional parameters in the model, indicates 13 Controlling for GDP per capita, age of democracy or accession year also makes no difference to the results. that Model 2 is the preferred model for the economy and interest rates; as well as climate change and health care if we exclude 'size of the economy' from the model.
Conclusion
Despite the complex and dynamic nature of the EU, European citizens do appear capable of making distinctions in terms of what different levels of governments do, and their responsibility judgments are shaped by the institutional context. Our study of attribution of responsibility in the European Union has demonstrated that not only can citizens distinguish between the EU's degree of responsibility across policy domains, they are also responsive to the institutional context at both the national and the EU level of government. We have found that citizens in countries with highly effective national political institutions generally attribute less responsibility to the EU than citizens in countries with lower quality national political institutions. Variation across policy domains is also evident, as citizens in countries with an active involvement in specific policy areas, in particular large government-funded health care sectors and national strategies to deal with climate change, attribute less responsibility to the EU relative to their national government in these policy domains. Finally, it was evident that citizens in countries outside the Eurozone attribute less responsibility to the EU for the economy in general and monetary policy-making in particular.
However, while the institutional context helps to structure responsibility judgments in the European Union, we also find that group-serving attribution biases shape people's attributions of responsibility. Whereas the extant literature has focused almost exclusively on the role of partisanship, we find that another type of 'in-group/out-group' distinction is particularly salient in the EU, namely that between those individuals who feel exclusively attached to their nation, and are reluctant to surrender sovereignty to the EU level of government, and those who feel more positively disposed toward the EU and further European integration. Our results show that this distinction serves as a powerful modifier of responsibility judgments, as people who feel attached to the EU are more likely to attribute responsibility to this level of government when conditions are improving, whereas Euroskeptics tend to deny the EU any responsibility for positive outcomes. In contrast, we only find that national partisanship is important to voters when it comes to assigning responsibility to the EU relative to national governments in the areas of immigration and interest rates.
What are the normative implications of these findings? On the one hand, these finding suggest that citizens are capable of incorporating relevant contextual information into their responsibility judgments in a complex multi-level system of government such as the European Union. Not only are individuals' perceptions of political responsibility responsive to the institutional context, but the nature of this responsiveness implies that citizens are capable of rendering responsibility judgements in a reasoned manner. This demonstrates that despite the complexity and fluidity of political arrangements in the EU, citizens appear to make responsibility judgments informed by the context. On the other hand, the presence of strong group-serving attribution biases, while not unusual, may not be helpful to the functioning of democratic accountability in the EU. The use of heuristics, such as prior political attachments, can certainly be very useful in overcoming informational shortfalls. However, if assignment of responsibility in the EU is largely determined by people's feelings about the European Union -as Europhiles credit the EU with improving conditions as Euroskeptics blame them for all evils -this could certainly weaken the ability of voters to hold politicians accountable for the policy outcomes that they are responsible for. Of course, this raises another very important question, namely how responsibility judgments structure the way in which citizens attribute or blame for policy outcomes to national and European politicians. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the link between attribution of responsibility and vote choice in the European Union, but that is an important question for future research. Note: Hierarchical linear model with Net EU attribution for the economy as the Dependent Variable ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 Table 3 : Attributing responsibility to the EU for interest rates 
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